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NOTES
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
AWARD*
IN determining the credit which one state must extend to a workmen's
compensation award of another state, a conflict of conceptual principles
must be resolved by deciding which shall have the greater weight: the doc-
trine of res judicata under the full faith and credit clause, or the privilege of
each state to determine, according to its own standards, the compensation
which will be given its'injured workers. In Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Ifunt,t
the Supreme Court considered more important the principle that an award,
as a judgment, shall be entitled to the same credit in all states as in the state
where rendered. The Court reasoned that since one actionable injury can
give rise to only one "cause of action," the singleness of which is unaffected
by a change in legal theory, a second proceeding under the Louisiana Com-
pensation Act was barred where compensation for the same injury had been
received under the Texas statute.
In the recent case of Loudenslager v. Gorum,2 however, the Shpreme Court
of Missouri held that the Magnolia ruling did not preclude a recovery under
the Missouri Compensation Act where compensation for the same injury
had been denied under the Arkansas statute. The apparent contradiction
between the two decisions calls for an examination of the issues involved.3
The most important reason for this conflict in conceptual analysis is the
failure of the courts to recognize the difficulties involved in defining a "cause
of action" independent of the purpose for which it is used and the context
to which it is applied. 4 This failure has been evident in cases involving the
* Loudenslager v. Gorum, 195 S. W. (2d) 498 (Mo. 1946).
1. 320 U. S. 430 (1943) (Hunt, a resident of Louisiana, employed in that state by the
Magnolia Petroleum Company, was injured in Texas while in course of employment). See
generally Cheatham, Res Judicata and the Full Faith and Credit Clause: Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt (1944) 44 COL. L. REv. 330; Wolkin, Workmen's Compensation Award-Com.
monplace or Anomaly in Full Faith and Credit Pattern? (1944) 92 U. or PA. L. REV. 401.
2. 195 S. W. (2d) 498 (Mo. 1946).
3. Where compensation has been previously granted, the Magnolia ruling has been
uniformly followed. Butler v. Lee Bros. Trucking Contractors, 206 Ark. 884, 178 S. W. (2d)
58 (1944); Overcash v. Yellow Transit Co., 352 Mo. 993, 180 S.'W. (2d) 678 (1944). Literal
adherence to this rule is evident in a recent decision denying the greater compensation
available under the Wisconsin act because of a previous recovery under the Illinois statute,
although the settlement order before the Illinois commission specifically stated that claim-
ant's rights under the Wisconsin act were not forfeited by the settlement. McCartin v.
Industrial Commission, 248 Wis. 570, 22 N. W. (2d) 522 (1946), cert. granted, 15 U. S. L.
WEEK 3135 (U. S. 1946).
4. The Supreme Court has stated that the phrase, "cause of action," is not "suscepti-
ble of any single definition that will be independent of the context or of the relation to be
governed." United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 68 (1933). For con-
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Federal Employers' Liability 5 and state workmen's compensation acts,
which are mutually exclusive in their application.8 Reasoning that a single
injury gives rise to one "cause of action," the Supreme Court has barred a
recovery under the Federal Act where the plaintiff, for the same injury,
previously had a favorable award under the state act.7 But where the plain-
tiff proceeds under the mistaken supposition that his employment is in-
trastate 8 and is denied compensation under the state act, the Court has not
held this judgment a bar to his recovery under the Federal Act.9 If claimant,
having suffered one actionable injury, has only one "cause of action," the
denial of compensation, viewed as an adjudication of this "cause of action,"
would operate as an effective bar to recovery in a subsequent suit for the
same injury, though under a different statute. To avoid this result and yet
maintain the singleness of the "cause of action," the courts refer to the fact
that since there was no possible choice of two inconsistent remedies, plaintiff
is not barred because of the "unsuccessful pursuit of an inapplicable rem-
edy." 10
flicting interpretations of the effect of this decision see Arnold, The Code "Cause of Action"
Clarified by United States Supreme Court (1933) 19 A. B. A. J. 215 and Gavit, A "Pragmatic
Definition" of The "Cause of Action"? (1933) 82 U. OF PA. L. REV. 129.
5. 35 ST.T. 65 (1908), 53 STAT. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S. C. §§ 51-60 (1940).
6. In the Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1, 53-5 (1912), the Court held
that the Federal Act, which regulates the liability of interstate carriers by railroad for in-
juries to their employees engaged in such commerce, supersedes the laws of the states, in so
far as it covers the same field. Thus where the injury occurred in interstate commerce the
Federal Act is exclusive in its operation. On the other hand, if the injury occurred outside
of interstate commerce, the Federal Act is without application, and the state law is con-
trolling. Wabash R. R. v. Hayes, 234 U. S. 86,89-90 (1914). And in N. Y. Central R. R. v.
Winfield, 244 U. S. 147 (1917), the Court held that the Federal Act prevented the applica-
tion of any state act to a railroad employee injured while engaging in interstate commerce,
though the Federal Act offered no remedy because of the absence of negligence.
7. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611 (1926).
8. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's role in deciding the nature of the com-
merce involved, see FRANEFURTER AND LANDIS, THE Busnrss OF TnE Suep~uAE Courr
(1928) 206-8.
9. Troxell v. Delaware, L. & IV. R. R., 227 U. S. 434 (1913). See Hogan v. New York
Cent. & H. R. R., 223 F. 890 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1915) (bringing and subsequent discontinuance
of a suit under state act is not a bar to a later suit under Federal Act); Waters v. Guile, 234
F. 532 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916) (filing of a claim under the state act, not prosecuted to recovery,
is -not an effective election as against a remedy under the Federal Act). In permitting a
recovery under the state act after a federal court had rejected the claim because the em-
ployee was not engaged in interstate commerce, the Michigan court said: "There is a differ-
ence between an election of remedy and a mistake of remedy, and the law has not gone so
far as to deprive parties of meritorious claims merely because of attempts to collect them
by inappropriate actions upon which recovery could not be had." Hansen v. Pere Marquette
Ry., 267 Mich. 224,227,255 N. XV. 192,193-4 (1934).
10. Waters v. Guile, 234 F. 532, 536 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916). The Court in this case as-
sumes that had the plaintiff the option of proceeding under either act, his action would have
amounted to an election which would bar his suit under the Federal Act. "But election pre-
supposes a choice of remedies, and where there is but one remedy available there can be no
choice of remedies. . . ." ibid. See RESTATEmENT, JUDG E s (1942) § 65(k).
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In the somewhat analogous situation, involving the applicability of two
state compensation acts to the same injury, the Supreme Court established
the doctrine that recovery may be had under the laws of the state of injury 11
or the state of the employment relationship," the field of workmen's com-
pensation being one to which the usual conflict of laws rule does not apply. 13
Since questions of policy vital to the interests of each state are materially
involved, the Court found that each state was constitutionally empowered
to apply its internal law and need not subordinate its domestic policy to the
laws of another.14 The same reasoning which urged the establishment of
this doctrine, affording a choice of remedies to the injured employee, would
seem to apply with equal validity to the practice of a majority of the states
which allowed a second recovery, but limited the total recovery to the high-
est compensation available under the act most favorable to the claimant."
11. Any implication in Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932)
that the state of injury could not apply its own act, even where its public policy so dictated,
was rejected by Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 306 U. S. 493
(1939).
12. Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California, 294 U. S.
532 (1935). For a discussion of the factors required before the local act may be applied to
extraterritorial accidents see (1943) 57 HARV. L. REV. 242.
13. The earlier cases involving workmen's compensation acts treated them as a statu-
tory substitution for the common law of torts. Under this theory recovery could be had
only under the laws of the state in which the wrong occurred, the state of injury. A second
approach treated the obligation to pay compensation as the outgrowth of a contract, and
under this theory recovery could be had in the state where the contract of employment was
made. A third view, and the one adopted by the Supreme Court, regarded the compensation
acts as a statutory regulation of the employer-employee relationship, the purpose of which
was to shift the burden of industrial accidents from the individual to the industry. See
GOODRicH, CoNFLICT OF LAWS (2d ed. 1938) § 97; 2 BEALE, THE CONFLICT Or LAWS (1935)
§§ 398.1-401.3.
14. " In denying that the full faith and credit clause required the state of California to
invoke the statute of Alaska rather than its own, the Court stated: "It has often been
recognized by this Court that there are some limitations upon the extent to which a state
will be required by the full faith and credit clause to enforce even the judgment of another
state, in contravention of its own statutes or policy." Alaska Packers Association v. Indus-
trial Accident Comm. of California, 294 U. S. 532, 546 (1935). And in the Pacific Employers
case the Court held that the full faith and credit clause did not "override the constitutional
authority of another state to legislate for the bodily safety and economic protection of em-
ployees injured within it." Pacific Employers Insur. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm., 306
U.S. 493, 503 (1939).
15. Migues' Case, 281 Mass. 373, 183 N. E. 847 (1933); Miller v. National Chair Co.,
127 N. J. L. 414, 22 A. (2d) 804 (1941), aff'd, 129 N. J. L. 98, 28 A. (2d) 125 (1942); Gil-
bert v. Des Lauriers Column Mould Co., 180 App. Div. 59, 167 N. Y. Supp. 274 (3d Dep't
1917); Price v. Horton Motor Lines, 201 S. C. 484, 23 S. E. (2d) 744 (1942); Salvation Army
v. Industrial Comm., 219 Wis. 343, 263 N. W. 349 (1935). The Ohio statute clearly provides
for such recovery. Oro GEN. CODE ANN. (Page, 1938) § 1465-8. Others indicate that this
result should be reached. See FLA. STAT. ANN. (1943) § 440.09(1); GA. CODE AN., (1938)
TIT. 114, § 411; MD. ANN. CODE (Flack, 1939) Art. 101, § 80(3); N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie
& Sublett, 1939) § 8081(rr); S. C. CODE (1942) § 7035-39; VA. CODE ANN. (1942) § 1887
(37)(b). See also GooDaicu, op. cit. supra note 13, at 243; 2 BEALE, op. cit. supra note 13,
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This was in no sense a double recovery, but was merely an attempt to insure
that the injured employee would receive the maximum compensation pos-
sible.
In the Magnolia case, the first instance in which the constitutionality of
this practice was presented to the Supreme Court, it was held that since
there was only one "cause of action," and that cause having become res
judicata in one state,16 the full faith and credit clause requires that it be
recognized as such in every other state.'7 Though the injured employee was
free to pursue a remedy under either of the applicable acts, the Court de-
dared that his choice of one precluded his seeking the other. A change in
legal theory does not constitute a change in the "cause of action" to avoid a
plea of res judicata in a claim based on the same injury, under a different
statute. A consistent application of this reasoning to cases involving mu-
tually exclusive statutes would necessitate a denial of compensation to a
claimant who, having pursued his one possible remedy under a mistaken
legal theory, seeks recovery under the correct statute. In just this situation,
the Supreme Court in Troxell v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. 1' had previously
allowed recovery on the ground that the "cause of action" under the state
law was based on a different theory than that under the Federal law.23 The
Court in the Magnolia case finally rejected this notion, but attempted to
sustain the results of the Troxell decision by alowing a recovery for the
claimant who "has been denied a remedy by one state because it does not
afford a remedy for the particular wrong alleged. . . ." -
This ambiguous exception in the reasoning of the Court has been inter-
preted to mean that a denial of compensation in one state is not a bar to
§ 403.1; 1 SCHNEIDER, VORK N'S COMPENSATION TrXr (3d ed. 1941) § 160; DODD, AD-
MIMSTRATION OF VOMEN'S COMPENSATION (1936) 819; RESTATEM ENT, Co.,FIaC-r Op
LAWS (1934) § 403. For a discussion of this point see AMERICAN LAW INSTIruTE PRccEED-
INGS (1932) Vol. 10, pp. 76-8. Contra: Hughey v. Ware, 34 N. M. 29, 276 P. 27 (1929); Tid-
well v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 163 Tenn. 420, 43 S. NV. (2d) 221 (1931); De Gray
v. Miller Bros. Const. Co., 106 Vt. 259, 173 Atl. 556 (1934).
16. For the purpose of internal state administration, a final compensation award is res
judicata in a subsequent proceeding in the forum of the award with respect to the same in-
jury. See Note (1939) 122 A. L. R. 550; 1 SCHNEIDER, op. cit. supra note 15, § 100.
17. For a general discussion of the applicability of the full faith and credit clause to
administrative determinations see Abel, Adrninistratire Determinations and Full Faith and
Credit (1937) 22 IOWA L. REv. 461.
18. 227 U. S. 434 (1913). Claimant, as widow of the deceased, brought suit under the
Pennsylvania statute, and was denied recovery in this action because of the fellov.-servant
rule. In a second action, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, claimant sued for
recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, which allows recovery for the negli-
gence of fellow-servants.
19. A second basis for the Court's decision was the lack of identity df parties, one of the
requisites to the operation of a judgment as res judicata. This theory has apparently been
overruled by a later decision which held that when the parties and interests involved are the
same, though differently named, res judicata applies. Chicago, R. 1. & P. Ry. v. Schendel,
270 U.S. 611, 618 (1926). See Moschzisker, Res Judicata (1929) 38 YAL L. J. 299,310.
20. 320 U.S. 430,444 (1943).
19471
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
recovery in a second state.2 1 In the Loudenslager case, where the claimant,
widow of the deceased, was denied compensation in Arkansas on the ground
that the deceased was an independent contractor and not an employee, the
Missouri Court claimed that this situation was analogous to that in the
Troxell case. It was argued that since the terms "employer" and "employee"
depend for their definitions on the different statutes concerned, a determina-
tion of the status of the deceased under the Arkansas Act 22 could not prevent
Missouri from reaching a different conclusion under its own act.23
Though the Supreme Court in the Magnolia case deviated from its one
"cause of action" premise to cover a particular group of cases, the Missouri
court's interpretation, which would completely contradict this premise,
would seem invalid. According to the rule set down by the Supreme Court,
an award granting compensation is as conclusive of the rights of the parties
in all other states as in the state in which it was rendered. Within the forum
of the award, a denial of compensation is no less conclusive as a determina-
tion of the rights involved than an award granting compensation, 24 Most
states provide that where compensation has been granted, modifications
.may be made by the commission in the event of changed conditions.2 15 But
21. "If the claim under the Texas Act had been denied because of statutory defenses
accorded the employer, I do not suppose that the requirements of full faith and credit would
bar the subsequent claim under a Louisiana statute which did not recognize such defenses,"
Mr. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Magnolia v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 447-8 (1943). VFor an
interpretation that the Magnolia decision bars recovery in a second suit only where there
has been a previous judgment favorable to the plaintiff, see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cardillo,
141 F. (2d) 362, 363 (App. D. C. 1944).
22. ARK. STAT. ANN. (Pope, Supp. 1944) 1360 el seg.
23. The Missouri statute includes as a statutory employee, an independent contractor
who is "injured or killed on or about the premises of the employer while doing work which
is in the usual course of his business." Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1939) § 3698(a). The Missouri
court has denied compensation to independent contractors injured on public highways,
Doyle v. Erard, 227 Mo. App. 384, 54 S. W. (2d) 1006 (1932); Rutherford v. Tobin Quarriers,
336 Mo. 1171, 82 S. W. (2d) 918 (1935). In the Loudenslager case, the decision of the Mis-
souri court is that the deceased, killed on a highway, was an employee within the act, but
not an independent contractor employed on or about the premises. Loudenslager v. Gorum,
195 S. W. (2d) 498, 501 (Mo. 1946). For the definitions of "employer" and "employee" in
the statutes concerned see ARK. STAT. ANN. (Pope, Supp. 1944) 1360-1 and Mo. Rav. STAT.
ANN. (1939) §§ 3692, 3695(a).
24. Concho Washed Sand Co. v. Worthing, 166 Okla. 105, 26 P. (2d) 415 (1933) (,n-
appealed order of Industrial Comm. denying compensation,.is final and conclusive); State v.
Industrial Accident Board, 94 Mont. 386, 23 P. (2d) 253 (1933); Boyich v. J. A. Utley Co.,
306 Mich. 625, 11 N. W. (2d) 267 (1943); Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. v.,Pruitt,
58 S. W. (2d) 41 (Tex. Comm. App. 1933). The doctrine of res judicata is equally applicable
to judgments for the plaintiff and for the defendant. See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMtNTS (1942)
§§ 61-3.
25. It has long been recognized that the successful administration of workmen's com-
pensation is incompatible with a strict adherence to the doctrine of res judicata. Since in
most cases it is difficult to predict accurately the extent of claimant's injury at the time
compensation is awarded, nearly all the states provide some modification provision in the
event of changed conditions. Under these statutes, an award of compensation is only res
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an award denying compensation, unappealed to the courts, is regarded as a
final determination which cannot be altered.' If full faith and credit must
be extended to one award, consistent reasoning would require that it be
extended to the other.
The dominant theme of the Supreme Court's decisions in the Alaska
Packers 27 and the Pacific Employers cases 2 is the right of each state, in
matters of vital public interest, to enforce its own statute to the disregard
of the laws of another state. Under the reasoning of those cases, Missouri's
interest in preventing the pauperization of its citizens would seem sufficient
to justify the enforcement of its own act. But under the ruling in the Mag-
nolia case a state may be forbidden to extend its compensation act to cover
its own citizens who, but for a previous denial under a different statute,
would be entitled to compensation. An indiscriminate extension of the
privilege of a state, on the basis of legitimate interest, to ignore the previous
adjudications of other states would have a disruptive effect on our federal
system.2 But the nature of workmen's compensation, as protective legisla-
judicata as to the condition of the claimant at the time of the award, but is not a bar to
subsequent modifications. See JoNEs, DIGESr OF WVoREMEN'S CouPENssTiox L,,ws (12th
ed. 1931) § 26; Note (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 148.
26. A condition precedent to the altering of an award is the existence of previous com-
pensation. Where the award is one denying compensation, the commission or board has no
jurisdiction to reopen the case, and if such award is unappealed to the courts, it is a conclu-
sive and final adjudication of the rights of the parties involved. See Rhindress v. Atlantic
Steel Co., 71 Ga. App. 898, 32 S. E. (2d) 554 (1944); Mishler v. Kelso Grain Co., 133 Kan.
38, 298 P. 655 (1931); Olentine v. Calloway, 147 Okla. 137, 295 P. 608 (1931). A similar
ruling existed in Texas. Cooper v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 33 S. W. (2d)
189 (Tex. Comm. App. 1930). But an amendment was added to the statute permitting re-
view of orders denying compensation within 12 months after they are issued. TEx. Civ.
STAT. ANN. (Vernon, 1925) Art. 8306, § 12(d).
27. Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Comm. of California, 294 U. S.
532 (1935).
28. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. IndustrialAccident Comm., 306 U. S. 493 (1939).
29. In the second Wi!lams case, the Supreme Court was willing to countenance the
probable disruptive effect of its decision in holding that a Nevada divorce decree was not a
valid defense to a prosecution for bigamy in North Carolina, where a North Carolina jury
found that no bona fide domicile had been acquired in Nevada. \Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U. S. 226 (1945). A comparison of the situation in divorce proceedings with that in
workmen's compensation reveals important differences in procedure and in the degree of
reconcilability of conflicting policies. However, Mr. Justice Jackson found the two problems
sufficiently analogous to compel his concurrence in the Magnolia case, decided by a Court
split 5-4. Mr. Justice Jackson, who dissented in the first Willians case, regarded himself
bound by the majority decision in that case, Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U. S. 287
(1942), the effect of which decision Mr. Justice Jackson apparently interpreted to be broader
than was revealed in the second Wi/!iams case. In the Magnolia case, Mr. Justice Jackson
was unable to see how Louisiana could "be constitutionally free to apply its own workmen's
compensation law to its citizens despite a previous adjudication in another state if North
Carolina was not free to apply its own matrimonial policy to its own citizens after judgment
on the subject in Nevada." Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 446 (1943).
Since under the second Williams case North Carolina may reexamine the question of domi-
cile previously decided by a Nevada Court, a possibility which Mr. Justice Jackson appar-
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tion for injured workers, enforced in most states by administrative commis-
sions empowered to consider only their own statutes, would seem to call for
special treatment." The anomalous position of workmen's compensation
in the conflict of laws is a result of these special considerations, which sug-
gest that no differentiation should be made between the credit which is ex-
tended to a statute and to an award arising under it.31
The difficulties created by the Magnolia decision serve to emphasize the
need to reconsider the doctrines adopted in that case. Since the amount
recoverable under any workmen's compensation act is at best only a partial
indemnification for the loss, both economic and physical, suffered by the
injured employee,3 2 that policy which permits the employee to recover the
maximum amount available 13 under the applicable acts would seem socially
desirable. In refusing to allow a second suit, the Supreme Court has lessened
the possibilities of maximum recovery, and in a sense punishes the injured
employee for a mistake which he is often unable to avoid. At the time of his
injury, the employee quite likely is unaware of the existence of two different
remedies. Ignorant of the claims procedure, concerned primarily with the
immediate care of his family, the claimant will sometimes rely on his em-
ployer's advice,34 and may easily be induced to sign a claim under the less
favorable act.35 The employee may at times be maneuvered into an un-
favorable position by a procedural device which enables the employer to
initiate proceedings.36 Even the knowledge that a greater recovery is possi-
ently thought was precluded by the first Williams case, it appears that the reasons which
compelled his concurrence in the Magnolia decision are no longer valid.
30. For a discussion of the special factors in workmen's compensation see Cheatham,
supra note 1, at 343.
31. "If a state statute, by providing that the bringing of a proceeding for an award
shall bar any other claim, could not have precluded a claim in another state, it is difficult to
appreciate why an award itself should have greater effect, where the tribunals of the state
making it could not have considered the other claim." Freund, Chief Justice Stone and the
Conflict of Laws (1946) 59 HARv. L. REV. 1210,1229.
32. While it is true that the position of the injured worker under a compensation act is
much better than under the common law, it is also a fact that "in many cases the benefits
obtainable have been too low for subsistence, and the injured worker has at times become
dependent upon private charity or public relief." UNITED STATES Bu~rAtr ov LADOR STA-
TisTIcS, BULLETIN No. 672 (1940) 71.
33. The amounts available under the various statutes differ considerably. Id. at
202-12.
34. See Overcash v. Yellow Transit Co., 352 Mo. 993, 180 S W. (2d) 678 (1944).
Claimant, widow of the deceased employee, asked the employer's lawyers to recommend
counsel to represent her. Claim was filed in Kansas, but after learning from another lawyer
the possibilities of a far greater recovery in Missouri, claimant attempted to withdraw suit
in Kansas and to recover under the Missouri statute. The Kansas commission refused, and
claimant was awarded compensation under that statute, which precluded recovery in Mis-
souri.
35. See Magnolia v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430 (1943). Claimant was told that he could not
collect compensation unless he signed the forms presented to him, and in order to collect
he signed the forms. See Mr. Justice Black dissenting, id. at 450.
36. See Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Schendel, 270 U. S. 611 (1926). The surviving widow
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ble may prove of no avail once a claim has been filed, for some statutes will
not allow a withdrawal m Under the present doctrine these factors may pre-
clude the injured employee from obtaining the greatest award, and in so
doing they constitute a partial frustration of the purpose of workmen's
compensation.
The effect of the Magnolia decision might be limited by legislation, both
state 33 and federal,39 but the more feasible suggestion is a reconsideration of
the doctrines established in that case. If the desirable results of the Lou-
denslager case are to be sustained,"0 the Supreme Court must modify its
"one cause of action" premise. In procedural questions of amendment it
has been reasonably held that a change in legal theory does not constitute a
change in the "cause of action." 41 But an extension of this doctrine to the
problem of the conflict of laws in workmen's compensation has created an
undesirable situation. The more logical policy might here hold that for the
purpose of res judicata a change in legal theory effects a change in the
"cause of action."
instituted suit under the Federal Act, and soon after the employer railway company started
proceedings before the Iowa Industrial Commission. Under the Iowa statute either em-
ployer or employee may file a petition for arbitration. Iow, CODE (1946) § 86.14. See also
Landreth v. Wabash R. PL, 153 F. (2d) 98 (C. C. A. 7th, 1946) (defendant filed for adjust-
ment of claim with the Illinois Industrial Commission).
37. See Loudenslager v. Gorum, 195 S. W. (2d) 498 (Mo. 1946) (After a claim had been
filed with the Arkansas commission and hearings had begun, claimant filed a dismissal of
the claim. Defendant filed objections to the dismissal, which the commission treated as a
motion to dismiss and issued an order denying it); Overcash v. Yellow Transit Co., 352 Mo.
993,180 S. IV. (2d) 678 (1944).
38. One possible solution is that the states specifically allow recovery under their laws
even where there has been a previous recovery under another statute. This course was left
open by the Court's decision which held that there was "no occasion to consider what effect
would be required to be given to the Texas award if the Te-xas courts held that an award of
compensation in another state would not bar an award in Texas... ." Magnolia Petroleum
Co. v. Hunt, 320 U. S. 430, 443 (1943). A more feasible proposal is that legislation be
enacted by the states, permitting a claimant to stay the proceedings before an award has
been granted, and providing for the revocation of such award upon the application of claim-
ant within a reasonable period after it is rendered. See Wollin, supra note 1, at 411.
39. Congressional legislation could also solve the problem by excepting workmen's
compensation awards from the application of the full faith and credit clause. "The manda-
tory force of the full faith and credit clause as defined by this Court may be, in some degree
not yet fully defined, expanded or contracted by Congress." Mr. Justice Stone dissenting in
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U. S. 202, 215 n. 2. However, the constitutionality of such
legislation may be questioned. See Freund, supra note 31, at 1230.
40. Petition for certiorari has been filed, 15 U.S. L. WrE3128 (U.S. 1946).
41. See United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U. S. 62, 6S (1933), in effect
overruling Union Pacific Ry. v. Vyler, 158 U. S. 285 (1895).
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TAXABILITY OF PROCEEDS ON SALE OF A RIGHT
TO INCOME FOR LIFE*
IF the owner of a right to income for life-either as the owner of a legal
life estate or as the beneficiary of a trust-surrenders or sells the interest in
return for a lump sum payment by a purchaser, the transaction may be
treated in either of two ways for federal income tax purposes. It may be
regarded as the receipt in advance of the future income payments, in which
case the consideration received would be taxable as ordinary income.1 Or it
may be treated as the sale of a capital asset so that the capital gain and loss
provisions 2 of the Internal Revenue Code would apply. The latter alterna-
tive was recently adopted in a decision 3 which subordinated the statutory
concept of a capital asset by emphasizing the legal concept of the interest as
"property."
The taxpayer Was the beneficiary of a testamentary trust and had sur-
rendered her interest to the remainderman pursuant to a state probate court
decree. 4 She computed the present value of her right to future income pay-
ments based upon her life expectancy, subtracted the $55,000 consideration
paid by the remainderman, and reported the difference I as a capital loss I
on her income tax return. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's con-
tention that this was not a capital transaction and that the full $55,000 was
taxable as ordinary income,7 but the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, Judge Frank dissenting, reversed the determination t'
Faced with a choice between two lines of authority stemming from tax
decisions of the Supreme Court, the majority of the court considered that
Blair v. Commissioner,9 which involved the separate and distinct problem of
allocating the tax on future payments of trust income after an assignment of
the beneficiary's interest, controlled the result.1" The dissent would have
McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
1. INT. REV. CODE § 22a (1939).
2. INT. REV. CODE § 117 (1939).
3. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
4. Though the trust contained spendthrift provisions, its termination was success-
fully accomplished. New Jersey Equity, Docket No. 129/370 (Ch., July 19, 1940). McAl-
lister v. Commissioner, 5 T. C. 714, 720-1 (1945). The state court's determination that the
beneficiary may alienate his interest is binding on a federal court. Blair v. Commissioner,
300 U. S. 5, 9-10 (1937).
5. The basis for the comparison was derived by the use of the expectancy tables Set
forth in I. T. 2076, 111-2 Cu'i. BULL. 18 (1924). The value of the life interest was computed
on the age of the beneficiary as of the time of transfer. 5 T.C. 714, 721 (1945).
6. INT. REv. CODE § 117 (b) (1939).
7. 5 T.C. 714 (1945).
8. 157 F. (2d) 235 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946).
9. 300 U. S. 5 (1937).
10. This view of the Blair case has been adopted in situations similar to the instant case.
Allen v. First National Bank and Trust Co., 152 F. (2d) 592 (C. C. A. 5th, 1946); Bell's
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followed Hort v. Commissioner,1 ' which involved the more analogous ques-
tion of whether the surrender of a lease was a capital transaction.
In the Blair case the income beneficiary of a testamentary trust made a
gift for life of a share in the future income. The Supreme Court applied the
conventional test 12 of whether income alone or the property producing the
income had been assigned, i.e., whether the "fruit" or the "tree" 13 had been
given away, and decided that the beneficiary-donor had parted with "prop-
erty" and was therefore not taxable on the future income payments when
received by the donee. The majority in the principal case, finding no dis-
tinction between the interest given away in the Blair case and that surren-
dered here, concluded that the interest being "property," must also be a
capital asset, the statutory definition of which is given in terms of "prop-
erty." 14 This conclusion is subject to criticism on three grounds.
First, subsequent cases have cast doubt upon the validity of the Blair de-
cision itself. It was once thought in assignment of income cases that reten-
tion of some control over the flow of income was decisive in determining the
taxable person. 5 But where a bondholder made an irrevocable gift of ac-
cumulated interest in the form of a bond coupon, 0 and where an insurance
agent made an assignment of earned, unpaid commissions, 17 both were held
taxable on the payments when made, though neither retained any control
over the flow of the income. Similarly taxed was a beneficiary of a life estate
after an assignment of a portion of the trust income for the period of a year. 5
In the exercise of the power to direct the flow of the income, the court found
such satisfaction '" accruing to the donors and aissignor as to render them
Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F. (2d) 454 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943); Randall v. Randall, 60 F.
Supp. 308 (S. D. Fla. 1944). Cf. Quigley v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d) 27 (C. C. A. 7th,
1944).
11. 313 U. S. 28 (1941).
12. See Buck, Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: The Deflection of Income (1936)
23 VA. L. Rv. 107, 123; Note (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 512, 513.
13. See-Lucas v. Earl, 281 U. S. 111, 115 (1930).
14. "§ 117. CAPITAL GAINS AND LossFs-(a) DEFINITIONS. As used in this chapter-
(1) CAPITAL ASSETS. The term 'capital assets' means property held by the taxpayer (whether
or not connected with trade or business), but does not include stock in trade of the taxpayer
or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the tax-
payer if on hand at the close of the taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business, of a character which is
subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in section 23 (1)." I.-. REv. CODE (1939).
15. See Pavenstedt, Tie Broadened Scope of Seaion 22 (a): The Evolution of the Clifford
Doctrine (1941) 51 YALE L. J. 213, 240.
16. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112 (1940), (1941) 41 COL. L. REv. 340.
17. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U. S. 122 (1940).
18. Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U. S. 579 (1941). See Notes (1941) 50 YALE L. J. 512,
(1941) 54 HARV. L. REv. 1405.
19. "Such a use of his economic gain, the right to receive income, to procure a satisfac-
tion which can be attained only by the e-xpenditure of money or property, would seem to be
the enjoyment of income whether the satisfaction is the purchase of goods .. . , the pay-
ment of his debt .. . , or such non-material satisfactions as may result from the payment of
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taxable, although they had given up all future control. By this analysis it
would seem that the life beneficiary in the Blair case should have been tax-
able as well. In relation to its own problem of the allocation of the future
tax on income payments, the Blair case stands alone, limited to its own
facts.
2
Second, whatever the present validity of the Blair decision is, the conclu-
sion that the interest involved is "property" for one purpose is not conclu-
sive that it is also a capital asset. The courts have generally refused to re-
gard as capital transactions various transfers of "property," especially those
by which the transferors have procured advance payments of income. This
was emphatically demonstrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Hort v.
Commissioner,21 where the sum received by a lessor for the cancellation of a
lease was held taxable as ordinary income despite the fact that the lease for
other purposes may be called "property." 22 Similarly, the consideration
received by a stockholder for the sale of his rights to a dividend declared but
not yet payable, 23 the payments made in return for a covenant not to engage
in a competing business,2 4 the income received by the lessor from an oil lease
whether by way of initial bonus or royalties on the oil subsequently pro-
duced,25 and payments made to a retiring partner representing a share in the
a campaign or community chest contribution, or a gift to his favorite son. Even though he,
never receives the money, he derives money's worth from the disposition of coupons which he
has used as money or money's worth in the procuring of a satisfaction which is procurable
only by the expenditure of money or money's worth." Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, 117
(1940).
20. The Supreme Court refused to apply the Blair rule in the Horst, Eubank and
Schaffner cases. See notes 16, 17, and 18 supra. The rule was further limited in Huber v.
Hevering, 117 F. (2d) 782 (App. D. C. 1941) where the beneficiary-assignor of all the trust
income for a period of a year was held taxable on the payments received by the assignee,
Groner, C. J., concurring, thought the Blair case overruled by the Eubank and Iorst cases.
Vinson, J., now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, writing for the majority, though con-
sidering the Blair doctrine "a nebulous concept" felt it necessary to distinguish it. Id. at
784-5. See also Pavenstedt, supra note 15, at 242-5.
21. 313 U. S. 28 (1941).
22. "The consideration received for cancellation of the lease was not a return of capital.
We assume that the lease was 'property,' whatever that signifies abstractly. Presumably the
bond in Helvering v. Horst, 311 U. S. 112, and the lease in Helvering v. Briun, 309 U. S. 461,
were also 'property,' but the interest coupon in Horst and the building in Bruun nevertheless
were held to constitute items of gross income. Simply because the lease was 'property' the
amount received for its cancellation was not a return of capital, quite apart from the fact
that 'property' and 'capital' are not necessarily synonymous in the Revenue Act of 1932 or
in common usage. Where, as in this case, the disputed amount was essentially a substitute
for rental payments which § 22 (a) expressly characterizes as gross income, it must be re-
garded as ordinary income, and it is immaterial that for some purposes the contract creating
the right to such payments may be treated as 'property' or 'capital.'" Id. at 31.
23. Rhodes' Estate v. Commissioner, 131 F. (2d) 50 (C. C. A. 6th, 1942).
24. Beals' Estate v. Commissioner, 82 F. (2d) 268 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); Salvage v. Com-
missioner, 76 F. (2d) 112 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Cox v, Helvering, 71 F. (2d) 987 (App. D. C.
1934).
25. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S. 103 (1932).
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future earnings as distinguished from a division of the partnership assets '
are taxable as ordinary income.' Regarded as essentially only the lump sum
payment of future income, the consideration received for the transfer of a
life interest would seem to require similar treatment.
That the interest transferred is essentially only the right to future income
was not an acceptable premise to the majority in the instant case because
the beneficiary of a trust has other rights.2" He may sue to enforce the trust,
enjoin a breach of the trust, and obtain redress in case of a breachP How-
ever, a recognition that the beneficiary has these additional rights should
not obscure the reality that they are collateral to and for the protection of
the one essential right to the income payments.O In the case of a legal life
estate the beneficiary's ownership of legal title might be similarly regarded."'
Third, a life interest, whether of a trust beneficiary or a legal life estate,
does not seem to fit the capital asset provisions of the Internal Revenue
26. Levinson v. Commissioner, 154 F. (2d) 60 (C. C. A. 2d, 1946); McClellan v. Com-
missioner, 117 F. (2d) 988 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941); Helvering v. Smith, 90 F. (2d) 590 (C. C. A.
2d, 1937).
27. Compare Swastika Oil & Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F. (2d) 382 (C. C. A. 6th,
1941); Ansorge v. Commissioner, 147 F. (2d) 459 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945).
28. "Petitioner's right to income for life from the trust estate w.as a right in the estate
itself. Had she held a fee interest, the assignment would unquestionably have been regarded
as the transfer of a capital asset; we see no reason why a different result should follow the
transfer of the lesser, but still substantial, life interest. As the Court pointed out in the Blair
case, the life tenant was entitled to enforce the trust, to enjoin a breach of trust, and to ob-
tain redress in case of breach." McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F. (2d) 235, 236 (C. C. A.
2d, 1946).
29. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U. S. 5 (1937).
30. "The right of a beneficiary of an income-producing trust is primarily the right to
receive the trust income. All his rights against the trustee and third persons who interfere
with the trust res are incidental; their purpose is to protect the primary right to receive the
income." MAGILL, TAXABLE IxcomE (Rev. ed. 1945) 303. See Note (1941) 50 YUXt L. J.
512, 516. Cf. Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 161 (1925); Lowery v. Commissioner, 70 F. (2d) 713
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934); Codman v. Miles, 28 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 4th, 1928), cert. denied, 278
U. S. 654 (1929). Several states have enacted statutes which declare that the whole estate or
interest in real property held in trust is vested in the trustee and that the beneficiary takes
no interest or estate in the corpus. The statutes are collected and discussed in I Bo rrr,
TRusTS AND TRUsTEES (1935) § 184. The exact nature of the beneficiary's interest is a sub-
ject of dispute with courts and commentators. Id. § 183. The conflicting views are dis-
cussed and the authorities are cited in 1 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY (3d ed. 1939) § 243. S2e
also Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17 COL L. REv. 269;
Stone, The Nature qf the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust (1917) 17 COL. L. Ruv. 467.
31. The Tax Court, however, has refused to extend this analysis to the transfer of a
legal life estate. Harman v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 335 (1944). Opper, J., 'who wrote the
Tax Court majority opinion in the McAllister case, dissented vith two others in the Harman
case. See also Estate of Camden, 47 B. T. A. 926 (1942), aff'd sub nona. Commissioner v.
Camden, 139 F. (2d) 697 (C. C. A. 6th, 1943) where tie consideration received by the wife
for the conveyance of real estate for life to her husband with reversion to herself, was held
taxable as a receipt from the sale of a capital asset rather than rental from a lease. The Tax
Court distinguished the sale of an income beneficiary's interest in a trust as "only the right
to receive income." 47 B. T. A. 926, 931 (1942).
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Code, the purpose of which was to encourage the conversion of capital in-
vestments by removing the excessive tax burdens which resulted from treat-
ing any gains from such transactions as ordinary income.3 2 The revenue
laws provide no adequate basis on which to compute the gain or loss on the
transfer of such a life interest. There is no cost which can be used as a basis.
The usual basis for bequests and legacies, value at the time of the testator's
death,3" urged by the Tax Court dissent in the McAllister case, 4 fails to take
into account the normal reduction in value of the life interest as the benefi-
ciary or owner grows older.35 It is virtually certain that the interest will fall
in value as the life-span of the beneficiary or owner grows shorter. The omis-
sion in the statute of a satisfactory basis provision would seem to indicate a
Congressional intent to exclude the sale or exchange of a life interest from
the scope of the capital asset section.
It is unfortunate that the Blair case, which has been severely limited by
the Supreme Court even in its own sphere of particular application, has been
extended by the principal case to the distinct problem of defining a capital
asset. To have followed the more analogous cases involving transfers of the
right to future income would have prevented the application of the capital
gain and loss provisions to an inappropriate type of interest.
STATE COURT EVASION OF UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT MANDATES:
STATE court independence has been frequently asserted by an evasion of
United States Supreme Court mandates.' A recent instance of the apparent
disregard of such a mandate is found in a Nebraska case, Hawk v. Olson.2
There petitioner, sentenced to life imprisonment after a murder conviction,
sought a writ of habeas corpus on grounds of perjured testimony, depriva-
tion of opportunity to consult counsel and prepare a defense, and subsequent
32. H. R. RE. No. 350, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) 10; SEN. REP. No. 275, 67th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1921) 12. See Kent, The Case for Taxing Capital Gains (1940) 7 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 194, 197. The tax was scaled to approximate a yearly tax on the annual
increments of value added to the asset realized as a whole by the sale or exchange.
33. INT. REV. CODE § 113 (a) (5) (1939).
34. 5 T.C. 714; 724-5 (1945).
35. The beneficiary-legatee is not allowed deductions for exhaustion of his interest.
INT. REV. CODE § 24 (d) (1939).
* Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb. 875, 22 N. W. (2d) 136 (1946).
1. See generally Comment, Final Disposition of State Court Decisions Reversed and
Remanded by the Supreme Court, October Term, 1931, to October Term,,1940 (1942) 55 HARV.
L. REV. 1357; Warren, Federal and State Court Interference (1930) 43 HAnV. L. REV. 345.
2. 146 Neb. 875,22 N. V. (2d) 136 (1946).
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curtailment of the right to appeal. During six years of persistent attempts in
five different courts to obtain a hearing on these allegations, ten former ap-
plications had been denied, all for technical or jurisdictional reasons, without
affording him a chance to prove the merits of his claims.' The Nebraska
Court rejected his eleventh request, stating that habeas corpus was a collat-
eral attack available only against a judgment void on its face, and that the
application stated mere conclusions rather than facts.4 The United States
Supreme Court, although accepting the Nebraska decisions that sufficiency
of evidence could ntt be raised by habeas corpus, and that Hawk's petition
did not establish any interference with his right to appeal, reversed and re-
manded,- declaring that the allegations included facts showing a deprivation
of the effective assistance of counsel, in violation of the due process clause of
the 14th Amendment, sufficient to entitle the petitioner to a hearing.
Nevertheless, Hawk's motion for compliance with the resulting mandate
was denied by the Nebraska Court.6 In the explanatory opinion the major-
ity stated that the Supreme Court must not have recognized the real basis of
the previous Nebraska decision, namely, that the applicant had mistaken
his remedy, and that under state procedure the issue of denial of counsel was
not justiciable in a habeas corpus proceeding. The Court further asserted
that although the Supreme Court might declare the petitioner's right to some
remedy under the 14th Amendment, it could not dictate within the state the
choice of one particular remedy.
The legal pattern of such attack on an appellate order 7 was set by the
3. Application denied on grounds that trial court had proper jurisdiction and that
habeas corpus was available only against a judgment void on its face. Hawk v. O'Grady,
137 Neb. 639, 290 N. V. 911 (1940), cert. denied, 311 U. S. 645 (1940); application to Dist. Ct.
of Lancaster County, Neb., denied (1941) [see 130 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942)1: 3rd suc-
'cessive application to U. S. Dist. Ct., D. Neb., containing present allegations, denied for lack
of federal jurisdiction until the newly alleged matter had been presented to state courts,
Hawk v. Olson, 130 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 697 (1943); appli-
cation directly to the Nebraska Supreme Court denied without opinion (1943) [see 321 U.S.
114, 115 (1944)]; original to U. S. Supreme Court denied without prejudice to application to
a district court, Fx parke Hawk, 318 U. S. 746 (1943); applications to both U. S. Dist. Ct.,
D. Neb., and senior circuit judge, 8th circuit, denied (1943) [see 321 U. S. 114, 115 (1944)1;
and original to U. S. Supreme Court denied for failure to exhaust state remedies, Ex parte
Hawk, 321 U. S. 114 (1944).
4. Hawk v. Olson, 145 Neb. 306, 16 N. W. (2d) 181 (1944), cert. graned, 324 U. S. 893
(1945).
5. Hawk v. Olson, 326 U. S. 271 (1945).
6. Hawkv. Olson, 146 Neb. 875, 22 N. W. (2d) 136 (1946).
7. The constitutionality of the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the
state courts was first settled in 1816. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816).
See Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 413-23 (U. S. 1821). Since then there have been few
direct challenges to the superior power of the Supreme Court. In the matter of Booth, 11
Wis. 498 (1859); and Worcester v. Georgia and Butler v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 597 (U. S.
1832) later disobeyed by the Georgia Supreme Court [no reported decision exists; case is
referred to in the Matter of Booth, supra at 529 and in Padelford v. Savannah, 14 Ga. 438,
481 (1854)]. See also Padelford v. Savannah, supra at 455-512. For an account of the con-
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early case of Davis v. Packard.8 There, with approval by affirmance, the
United States Supreme Court permitted the effect of its own opinion and
mandate to the dernier court of New York to be avoided, the latter court
having declared that under state law the appellate court's jurisdiction did
not permit a reversal of the trial court for a factual error not appearing on
the face of the record. The Supreme Court affirmance was hinged on the
New York court's recognition that a coram vobis writ was still available.
Variations on this method of avoidance, similarly founded on the autonomy
of state courts within the realm of state law, were subsequently authorized
by the Supreme Court.9 Among the devices used were a revised construction
of a state statute,10 the discovery of a hitherto unconsidered alternative
ground for judgment under state law," and the development of a "factual"
approach.
12
Two further rationales as grounds for evasion, at present untested by the
Supreme Court, were recently advanced by this same Nebraska Court in
Johnson v. Radio Station WOW. 13 In reviewing the original state decision, 14
flict and antagonism surrounding these early decisions, see Warren, Legislative and Judicial
Attacks on the Supreme Court of the United States-A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of the
Judiciary Act (1913) 47 Am. L. REv. 1, 16i.
8. 8 Pet. 312 (U. S. 1834).
9. For two evasions similarly based on state jurisdictional rules, not reviewed by the
U. S. Supreme Court, see Murphy v. The Factors' and Traders' Ins. Co., 36 La. An. 953
(1884); and Louisiana ex rel. The Southern Bank v. Pilsbury, 35 La. An. 408 (1883); but
cf. Kanouse v. Martin, 3 Duer 664 (N. Y. 1854). See generally Comment (1942) 55 HARV. L.
REv. 1357.
10. Georgia Power Co. v. Decatur, 179 Ga. 471, 176 S. E. 494 (1934), rev'd sub. lorn,
Georgia Ry. & Electric Co. v. Decatur, 295 U. S. 165 (1935); statute reconstrued, but judg-
ment given for same party, 181 Ga. 187, 182 S. E. 32 (1935), aff'd, 297 U. S. 620 (1936), 49
HARv. L. REv. 838; Schuykill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 302 U. S. 506 (1938); Lindsay v.
Washington, 194 Wash. 129, 77 P. (2d) 596 (1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 637 (1938).
11. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Scarlett, 300 U. S. 471 (1937), alternative
ground considered, 12 Cal. (2d) 549, 86 P. (2d) 85 (1939), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 657 (1939);
Coombes v. Getz, 285 U. S. 434 (1932), reversal avoided, 217 Cal. 320, 18 P. (2d) 939 (1933);
Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U. S. 146 (1917), reversal avoided, Barber v. Hartford
Life Ins. Co., 279 Mo. 316, 214 S. W. 207 (1919), aff'd, 255 U. S. 129 (1921). But cf. Lone
Star Gas Co. v. Texas, 304 U. S. 224 (1938), reversal avoided, 129 S. W. (2d) 1164 (1939),
rev'd, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S. W. (2d) 681 (1941). A variation is afforded by the reexamining of a
covered point of state law: State ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 214 Ind. 347, 5 N. E. (2d) 531,
913 (1937), on rehearing, 214 Ind. 352, 7 N. E. (2d) 777 (1937), rev'd, 303 U. S. 95 (1938),
evaded, 214 Ind. 356, 13 N. E. (2d) 955 (1938). Compare Hartford Acc. & Indemnity Co. v.
Delta & Pine Land Co., 169 Miss. 196, 150 So. 205 (1933), rev'd, 292 U. S. 143 (1934), evaded,
189 Miss. 496, 195 So. 667 (1940).
12. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 342 Mo. 121, 113 S. W. (2d) 783 (1938), holding
that state college need not admit negroes to its law school, rev'd on grounds that state must
provide equal educational facilities, 305 U. S. 337 (1938), returned by state supreme court to
lower court to decide whether entry could be denied on grounds that under a new appropria-
tion and statute the all-negro college provided the equal legal educational facilities, 3,14 Mo.
1238, 131 S. W. (2d) 217 (1939).
13. 146 Neb. 429, 19 N. W. (2d) 853 (1945), (1946) 34 GEo. L. J. 109, (1945) 59 HARV.
L. REv. 132, (1946) 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 379.
14. Johnson v. Radio Station WOW, 144 Neb. 406, 13 N. W. (2d) 556 (1944), motion
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the Supreme Court 5 had conceded the absolute jurisdiction of the state over
the issue of fraud in the lease of a radio station, but, in the interest of effectu-
ating the overriding policies of the Federal Communications Act, had ordered
certain changes to be made in the timing of the retransfer decree. 10 The
Nebraska Court, however, relying on Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concession of
state jurisdiction, held the situation to be within the principle of Davis v.
Packard and refused to comply.17 It was further asserted that a Supreme
Court mandate impinging on that jurisdiction violated Section 265 of the
Judicial Code " and might be treated as advisory.
Neither of the new rationales thus advanced seems tenable. It is true
that the Judicial Code's long-standing prohibition of federal injunctions
against state courts has been sometimes construed to include orders not di-
rectly restraining the court but necessarily having that effect." But it has
never been applied to successive decisions or orders in the identical action.
To do so would invalidate the entire theory and practice of appellate juris-
diction.20 Second, extension of the Davis v. Packard doctrine through reli-
for rehearing denied, 144 Neb. 432, 14 N. W. (2d) 666 (1944). In the supplemental opinion,
the court admitted that the power to license and to transfer a license was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the FCC, and stated that their former mandate was to be construed accord-
ingly only as directing the parties to do all things necessary to secure a return of the license.
15. Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120 (1945), Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr.
Justice Jackson dissenting.
16. The opinion indicated that state jurisdiction over the issue of fraud would be amply
respected if qualified by a required postponement of the retransfer of the physical properties
until the FCC -was enabled to act on the new license applications; id. at 132.
17. 146 Neb. 429, 19 N. V. (2d) 853 (1945).
18. The present statute reads, "The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court
of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such
injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." 36 STAT.
1162 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 379 (1940).
19. The following three cases were cited by the Nebraska Court: Stenger v. Stenger
Broadcasting Corp., 28 F. Supp. 407 (M. D. Pa. 1939); Reisler v. Forsyth, 21 F. Supp. 610
(D. N. J. 1937) (fed. ct. denied bill attempting to enjoin Beach Commission from expending
municipal funds, where the commission had obtained a mandamus in a state court directing
the mayor to credit them with such funds); and Amusement Syndicate Co. v. El Paso Land
Improvement Co., 251 Fed. 345 (W. D. Tex. 1918) (bill for injunction in fed. Ct. denied to
cestui where suit by the trustee for the same purpose -as pending in a state court w-ith
competent jurisdiction).
In general the statute is held applicable whenever the defendant in the federal court
would be liable for contempt on an attempt to take advantage of a state judgment. Hill v.
Martin, 296 U. S. 393 (1935); Harrison v. Triplex Gold Mines, 33 F. (2d) 667 (C. C. A. Ist,
1929); Western Union Tel. Co. of Ill. v. Louisville and N. R. R., 218 Fed. 628, 134 C. C. A.
386 (C. C. A. 7th, 1914) and cases cited therein; Dillon v. Kansas City S. B. Ry., 43 Fed. 109
(C. C. IV. D. Mo. 1890); Domestic and Foreign Missionary Society v. Hinman, 13 Fed. 161
(C. C. D. Neb. 1881); First Nat. Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 Fed. 737 (C. C. N. D.
Ohio 1881).
20. See (1946) 59 HARV. L. REv. 132 and cases cited supra note 19 for meaning of "order
indirectly restraining." Prior to 1941 the prohibition of Section 265 had been considerably
emasculated by both statutory and judicially implied exceptions even with respect to sepa-
rate suits. The Act had been held not to apply where the federal court obtains control over
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ance on conceded jurisdiction 21 appears to overlook completely the Supreme
Court resolution of intertwining state and federal questions. 22 Thus to inter-
pret that doctrine as Meaning that the state court may determine the divid-
ing line conflicts directly with the supremacy clause and its natural corollary
that the Supreme Court must be final arbiter of the extent of its own power. 23
The evasion in the Hawk case, in contrast, falls more directly into the
the res, where a state court judgment is "unconscionable," where the constitutionality of a
state statute is being tested while a suit in a state court is threatened, where prosecution of a
suit'in a state court is part of a violation of a federal statute, and where considered necessary
to protect federal jurisdiction. For discussion and illustrative cases, see Taylor and Willis,
The Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in Stale Courts (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 1169;
Comment (1933) 42 YALE L. J. 456; Comment (1940) 13 So. CALiF. L. REv. 331. In 1941,
however, a federal court was denied the power of injunction to protect its own decree and to
prevent relitigation of identical issues in a state court. The majority opinion reaffirmed the
res exception, but apparently denied or left in serious doubt the validity of all others. Toucey
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U. S. 118 (1941), discussed with approval (1942) 27 CORN,
L. Q. 270, criticized in (1942) 26 MINN. L. REv. 558, (1942) 16 TULANE L. REV. 468, and
(1942) 90 U. oF PA. L. RFv. 857.
The Nebraska reasoning appears to be based on the dogma that when a court transcends
its authority, its order is void. Lewis v. Peck, 154 Fed. 273 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907). But con-
trast applicability of two other oft-stated ,dicta: that the Section limits only power, not
jurisdiction, Jamerson v. Alliance Ins. Co., 87 F. (2d) 253, 256 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937); Smith v.
Apple, 264 U. S. 274, 278-9 (1924); and that the Section does not apply when the jurisdic-
tion of the federal court was properly acquired for purposes other than that of staying pro.
ceedings in a state court. Garner v. Second Nat. Bank, 67 Fed. 833, 836 (C. C. A. 1st, 1895);
Perry v. Sharpe, 8 Fed. 15, 24 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1881).
Actually all three dicta are equally out of context. Section 265 forbids injunctions issu-
ing from the United States Supreme Court to an inferior state court since no appellate rela-
tion between them exists. In re Slaughter-house Cases, 10 Wall. 273, 298 (U. S. 1869). It is
there clearly implied that where appellate jurisdiction exists Section 265 does not apply.
21. The Nebraska stand also draws some strength from certain logical inconsistencies
in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion. State jurisdiction to order retransfer of the
federally licensed facilities is there expressly conceded, even if, should the FCC not consent
to the license transfer, there might result a permanent split in license and facilities, thus
preventing effective operation. Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S. 120, 132 (1945).
In strict logic, this statement of state jurisdiction cannot lie with the further holding that tie
state court's decree trespasses on federal grounds because of the possibility of causing a
temporary separation.
The inconsistency described, however, is almost purely academic, because of the ex-
treme unlikelihood of a "permanent split." If the FCC should overlook the finding of fraud
and retiansfer order, its action would still be subject to eventual Supreme Court review. 48
STAT. 1093 (1934), 47 U. S. C. § 402 a (1940) in conjunction with 38 STAT. 220 (1913), 28
U. S. C. § 47 (1940). See FCC v. Columbia Broadcasting System of Cal., 311 U. S. 132
(1940); Comment (1942) 56 HARv. L. REv. 121; Comment (1942) 10 U, or Cut. L. Rrv. 88.
22. Even with concessions and possible inconsistencies, see note 21 supra, a federal
question as the basis of the retiming mandate is furnished by the pqlicy of the Federal Com-
munications Act to protect the public interest. Radio Station WOW v. Johnson, 326 U. S.
120, 132 (1945); 48 STAT. 1082 (1934), 47 U. S, C. § 303 (1940).
23. See Warren, loc. cit. supra note 1. Analogous is the power of the federal courts to
determine removability, a power held paramount to the "bootstrap doctrine" and reg




Davis v. Packard principle,24 but only if the assumption be made that Hawk
will in fact be granted a hearing on application for a writ of coram nobis or
on a statutory motion for a new trial, the only remaining possible remedies.
Until such an attempt is made, actual disobedience is not yet real. It is,
however, significant that in its first denial of this application the court stated
that a writ of coram nobis was the correct procedure for the introduction of
new evidence, 2' while its opinion after reversal contained no finding that
coram nobis would be allowed for a showing of denial of counsel; nor did it
include what course the applicant should properly have pursued. Instead,
the later opinion justified its result by pointing to the unused remedies which
had been available to petitioner after original conviction and cited the legal
principle that a constitutional right may be forfeited by the failure to make
timely assertion of that right. 6 If from these statements it may be deduced
that the court now deems the forfeited remedies the only ones allowable, and
so intends to deny a possible future request for a hearing, there is substantial
conflict with and disobedience of the Supreme Court mandate, -7 which was
24. After the decision of the principal case, Hawk again applied to a federal district
court for a writ of habeas corpus. Hawk v. Olson, 66 F. Supp. 195 (D. Neb. 1946). The
court declared that it had first granted the application on the grounds that any remaining
state remedies were apparently illusory. Then, before the trial, and because of the inter-
vening Supreme Court decision of Woods v. Neirstheimer, 66 Sup. Ct. 996 (U. S. 1946), it
here reversed itself for lack of jurisdiction until the state courts should finally declare their
position on remaining possible remedies.
Relative to the Nebraska evasion, the court stated: "... the quoted conclusion(s)
(from the principal case) . . . are the final-more accurately the latest-deliveranes upon
the matter (habeas corpus) by Nebraska's highest court. And this court will not presume to
disregard or question them or to deny the Nebraska court's right upon a ground of Nebraska
practice to deny compliance with the mandate of the United States Supreme Court. Nor,
it may be assumed, will the Supreme Court of the United States." Hawk v. Olson, supra at
198.
25. Hawkv. Olson, 145 Neb. 306,310, 16 N. W. (2d) 181, 183 (1944).
26. Hawk v. Olson, 146 Neb. 875, 881, 22 N. V. (2d) 136, 140 (1946).
27. For similar deduction see Hawk v. Olson, 66 F. Supp. 195, 200 (D. Neb. 1946).
Past Nebraska decisions on coram nobis and the statutory limitation on a motion for new
trial also tend to indicate that those remedies are not practically available to Hawk, and
therefore imply effective disobedience of the Supreme Court mandate. Writ of error coram
nobis has been generally held improper except for the introduction of new evidence not
known to the applicant at the time of the trial. State v. Boyd, 117 Neb. 320, 220 N. W. 281,
58 A. L. R. 1283 (1928); Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 84, 261 N. IV. 339 (1935); Newcomb v.
State, 129 Neb. 69, 261 N. W. 348 (1935); for discussion, see Hawk v. Olson, supra at 199-
201.
The Nebraska statute on motion for new trial reads in part:... and provided, fur-
ther, that such motion must be filed within three years after the date of such verdict, and such
motion and the procedure herein provided shall be the exclusive method and procedure for
reviewing criminal cases after the expiration of the term at which such verdict is rendered."
NEB. REv. STAT. (1943) § 29-2103.
Equally significant is the unusual silence of Nebraska's Attorney General on the proper
course open to the applicant and the adequacy of remaining remedies; silence in the face of
an order to show cause with particular attention to these points. Hawk v. Olson, 66 F. Supp.
195,196,199 (D. Neb. 1946).
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patently issued with full knowledge of the loss of some rights by petitioner.
As the extent of disobedience in the Hawk case is thus not yet definitely
ascertainable, and as the validity of the grounds of disobedience in the John-
son case will not now be tested in the Supreme Court, 2 these two Nebraska
opinions have significance and effect only in the contribution of their iota of
discredit to the country's judicial system. The layman expects that an ad-
judication of a party's rights by the United States Supreme Court is de-
terminative; and loss of respect follows naturally if its mandates are evaded 29
or if litigation is again prolonged.30
In the past, little has been done to prevent this type of discredit by taking
action against state courts after evasion has occurred. At times a reappeal
by the aggrieved party has forced the Supreme Court into action in affirm-
ance of its former decree. 3' Yet, with theoretical methods of enforcement
possibly available, including mandamus, 32 and even prosecution of the diso-
28. The Nebraska discussion was somewhat academic, because in effect, neither man-
date was followed. The parties to the old lease immediately adopted a new one more gener-
ous to the lessor, and apparently uncontested by the lessor's policy holder. Communication
to YALE LAW JOURNAL from Attorney for the defendant Radio Station WOW, Inc. See also
(1945) 59 HARV. L. REv. 132, 134.
29. To prevent such time-wasting and to preclude overcrowding of its docket by con-
fining itself to important federal issues, the Supreme Court has long refused to review state
judgments resting on an adequate state ground, even though there be error in the decision of
a federal question. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590 (U. S. 1874); Arkansas So. R. R. v.
German Nat. Bk., 207 U. S. 270 (1907); and cases collected in Note (1903) 63 L. R. A. 33, 42.
This practice thus blocks off an area of evasion by removing the necessity for its exercise,
precludes delay in litigation, and satisfies the parties by rendering a final judgment on the
crucial issue. The loss of respect stems from the restricted scope of the practice; the Supreme
Court appears to laymen as a final arbiter in most cases, but in the few as an adjudicator
whose power can be avoided through legal trickery. See Frankfurter, Distribution of .Judicial
Power Between United States and State Courts (1928) 13 CORN L. Q. 499, 503; Taft, Th
Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the Act of February 13,1925 (1925) 35 YALE L. J. 1, 2;
Hearings before Committee on the' Judiciary on S. 2060 and S. 2061, 68th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1924) 21; (1940) 49 YALE L. J. 1463; Comment (1941) 40 Micn. L. Rnv. 84.
But where an implicitly possible non-federal ground has been left unconsidered by the
state court, the Supreme Court of' necessity has reviewed the federal question. Internat.
Steel and Iron Co. v. Nat. Surety Co., 297 U. S. 657 (1936): With the Supreme Court unable
or unwilling to adjudicate undetermined state laws, a legitimate method of evasion is thus
left open to the state court, and prolonged litigation is likely to result; Grayson v. Harris, 90
Okla. 147, 216 Pac. 446 (1923) (judgment for defendant, a possible state ground left uncon-
sidered), rev'd on federal ground, 267 U. S. 352 (1925), rev'd again for defendant on the state
ground supra, 129 Okla. 281, 264 Pac. 623 (1928), rev'd on a new federal ground, 279 U. S.
300 (1929), rev'd and remanded for a new trial, 146 Okla. 291, 294 Pac. 187 (1930), judgment
in part for plaintiff aft'd, 173 Okla. 163, 47 P. (2d) 879 (1935).
30. "Justice delayed is justice denied." Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The
Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins (1946) 55 YALE L. J. 267, 294; see rearings before
Committee on the Judiciary on S. Res. 552, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. (1915) 15.
31. Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1896); Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U.S. 248 (1880);
Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Wall. 253 (U. S. 1872); Chaires v. United States, 3 How. 611 (U. S.
1845).
32. Both case law and statutes are inconclusive on the existence of the power or jurisdic-
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bedient state judges, 3 no remedy more severe than a directly issued award
of final execution 14 or a mandate ordering a specific judgment 3- has yet
been invoked.
To preclude evasion in the first instance the two most sweeping solutions
presently available would be a direct award of execution whenever feasible,"
or enforced waiver of alternative grounds for the state judgment not brought
in issue in the earlier litigation.Y7 The latter method might be further modi-
fied by Supreme Court recognition of its own ability to adjudicate undeter-
mined state law.3s Although none of these possible remedies would seem to
tion of the United States Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus to a state court. It has
been held an inappropriate remedy where writ of error is available and adequate. In re
Blake, 175 U. S. 114, 118 (1899). Compare dicta affirming the power, Ohio Oil Co. v. Thomp-
son, 120 F. (2d) 831, 835 (C. C. A. 8th, 1941); Inre Dowd, 133 Fed. 747, 751 (C. C. D. Colo.
1904); ln re Green, 141 U. S. 325, 327 (1891); Holmes v. Jennison, Appendix II, 14 Pet. 614,
632 (U. S. 1840) with dicta denying it, Graham v. Norton, 1S Wall. 427, 428 (U. S. 1872);
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 366 (U. S. 1816) (concurring opinion). See dis-
cussion in (1946) 14 GEo. WAsH. L. Rtv. 379, 380-1; and Comment, Jurisdictlion of the
Supreme Court to Issue M£andamus to a State Court (1942) 20 TEx. L. REv. 358, 361-5. How-
ever, in the latest Supreme Court decision bearing on the question, the Court denied a vwrit
of mandamus against the judges of the Supreme Court of Texas on grounds other than lack
of power to issue the writ, and after issuing an order to show cause as to why mandamus
should not be granted, Ex parte Texas, 315 U. S. 8 (1942).
33. See Holmes v. Jennison, Appendix II, 14 Pet. 614, 632 (U.S. 1840); and JuD. CODE
§ 268, REV. STAT. § 725 (1875), 28 U. S. C. § 385 (1940). No other instance where the power
has been discussed, even as to lower federal courts, has been found, and it is difficult to con-
ceive of an occasion so drastic as to require its use. Cf. in a state court, In re Mahon, 71 Cal.
586, 12 Pac. 868 (1887).
34. Tyler v. Magwire, 17 Wall. 253 (U. S. 1872); Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U. S. 248
(1880) both cited supra note 31. The original provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789, Sec.
25, permitted an award of execution only on second appeal, 1 STAT. 85 (1789); but, as pre-
ently amended, permit a direct award of execution at any time in the discretion of the
court, whether review is obtained by appeal or certiorari. JUD. CODE § 237, 43 ST.%T. 937
(1925), 28 U.S. C. § 344 (1940).
35. Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S. 255 (1896) cited supra note 31.
36. See note 34supra.
37. Analogous to the waiver of a constitutional right by failure to make timely asser-
tion thereof. Yakus v. United States, 321 U. S. 414, 444 (1944) and cases cited therein; nild
to the familiar waiver of a federal question for purposes of appeal unless adequately pre-
sented in the state court. White River Lumber Co. v. Arkansas cx r'd. Applegate, 279 U. S.
692, 700 (1929); Cleveland and Pittsburgh R. R. v.Cleveland, 235 U. S. SO, 53 (1914).
38. This modification would meet the problem of cases cited supra note 29. The scop2
of permissible review has been uniformly restricted to the federal questions which gave rise
to Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 cearly re-
quired this interpretation by a provision reading, "But no other error shall be assigned or
regarded as a ground of reversal .. . than such as . .. immediately respects the before
mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties, statutes,
commissions, or authorities in dispute." 1 STAT. 86-7 (1789). The rewritten statute of 1867
omitted this provision, but the identical rule was implied. Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall.
590 (U. S. 1874), construing 14 STAT. 386 (1867). The proposed modification would then
involve either a rejection of the implied absorption of the provision into the later act or a
reinterpretation of the meaning of the provision which would restrict its limitations to state
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conflict with the Constitution,39 nor with the present Judicial Code, 40 they
would entail an important change from present practices, perhaps dispro-
portionate to the magnitude of the ill. An additional objection lies in the
possibility of decisions inconsonant with the normal policies and substantive
law of a state.
41
A less thorough remedy not open to the above objections could be achieved
by an overruling of Davis v. Packard with respect to jurisdictional and pro-
cedural issues alone. 42 Although occasional decisions deviating from normal
state procedure might thereby result, verdicts under substantive law of the
state would be consistent.43 Such a limitation would considerably narrow
questions explicitly decided by the state court. But see on Supreme Court power to review
local law, Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U. S. 255, 279 (1896). Compare the recent voluntary
Supreme Court practice of delaying decision on a case originating in the lower federal courts
until the state courts have passed on applicable state questions. See Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 309 U. S. 478 (1940), 53 HARv. L. REV. 1394, (1943) 56 HARV. L, REV. 1162,
(1944) 53 YALE L. J. 788. For criticisiji, see Clark, supra note 30, at 293-5.
39. "In all the other Cases before mentioned," (including by construction cases from
the state courts, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816), cited sapra note 7)
"the Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such
Exceptions, and under such Regulations, as the Congress shall make." U. S. CoNsT. Art
III, § 2.
40. With reference to the appellate jurisdiction over state courts the Code provides:
"The appeal shall have the same effect as if the judgment or decree had been rendered or
passed in a court of the United States. The Supreme Court may reverse, modify, or affirm
the judgment or decree of such State court, and may, in its discretion, award execution or
remand the cause to the court from which it was removed by the appeal." JUD. CoDE § 237,
43 STAT. 937 (1925), 28 U. S. C. § 344 (1940). With respect to cases reviewed on writ of
certiorari, ". . . for review and determination, with the same power and authority, and with
like effect as if brought up by appeal. . . ." Ibid. The discretionary power to award execu-
tion would seem to include the lesser power to preclude the introduction of new issues of
state law. See also note 38 supra.
41. See Comment (1942) 55 HARv. L. REv. 1357, 1364-5.
42. By such a rule, state courts would be permitted to consider issues of state substan-
tive law, expressly or impliedly left open by the mandate, but would not bo permitted to use
procedural technicalities or previously unconsidered jurisdictional objections to prolong
litigation or to achieve a result opposite to that of the mandate. In effect, this principle has
been occasionally, if inconsistently, followed. ". . . our (Supreme Court) jurisdiction can-
not be now ousted, after we have acted upon the case and passed upon its merits, by any
suggestion that that court (the state court of appeals) never took jurisdiction to look into
the record of the inferior court and determine the character of its judgment." Williams v.
Bruffy, 102 U. S. 248,254-5 (1880).
43. Thus, with respect to the problem of the principal case, the Nebraska Court would
be privileged in the future to set an exclusive remedy other than habeas corpus for persons
in Hawk's position, and the Supreme Court would, as before, have no jurisdiction to review
the denial of an application made on grounds of incorrect remedy. But in the particular case
itself, having not originally clearly invoked such state ground, and having thus permitted the
question to be adjudicated by the Supreme Court, the Nebraska court would have no other
course open than to follow the mandate and grant an immediate hearing. The substantive
state law is unchanged except perhaps as modified by the Federal Constitution; the state
loses no real control over its own procedure; yet unnecessary litigation and the possibility
of a second Supreme Court review are eliminated.
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the field for state technical evasion without prolonging litigation, and the
unlikely event of state non-evasive defiance could then justifiedly be met by
one of the aforementioned modes of enforcement.
NEUTRALIZATION OF A TURNCOAT WITNESS' TESTIMONY
THE rule against impeaching one's own witness 1 by introduction of a
prior extra-judicial statement, if rigidly applied, leaves a party at the mercy
of a witness who has changed his story on the stand or revealed hitherto
hidden adverse testimony. To escape this result most jurisdictions by statute
or judicial decision have modified the rule without openly repudiating it.
2
The previous contradictory statement by the witness, however, still is ad-
missible only for the purpose of counteracting or "neutralizing" the damag-
ing testimony.3 Whether the testimony in chief has in fact been neutralized
is generally deemed a question for the jury,4 under express instructions from
* United States v. Michener, 152 F. (2d) 880 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
1. For the history and scope of the rule, see 3 VIGoMu, EvmEnE (3d ed. 1940)
§ 896 (hereinafter cited as 3 WTIGMonR); Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own ,'iness-ew
Developments (1936) 4 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 69-76. And see note 23 inTra.
2. "The rule in its original and strict form against impeaching one's own witnezs is
discredited everywhere.. . ..." Young v. United States, 97 F. (2d) 200, 205 (C. C. A. 5th,
1938). Since, by one stratagem or another, most jurisdictions have enabled parties to im-
peach their own witnesses by use of prior inconsistent statements, the rule survives- mainly
in limitations and conditions which must be distinguished or fulfilled.
According to the pre-ailing view, impeachment by proof of a prior inconsistent state-
ment will not be permitted unless the adverse testimony at the trial works both "surprise"
and "damage" on the party calling the witness. United States v. Maggio, 126 F. (2d) 155,
158-9 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942); Young v. United States, 97 F. (2d) 200, 205-6 (C. C. A. 5th,
1938). See 3 NVIGMORE § 904. As to what constitutes "surprise" and "damage" the courts
are at variance. See, e.g., United States v. Graham, 102 F. (2d) 436,442 (C. C. A. 2d. 1939);
Shaffman v. United States, 289 Fed. 370, 374 (C. C. A. 3d, 1923); Crago v. State, 28 Wyo.
215, 229, 202 Pac. 1099, 1104 (1922); cf. Kuhn v. United States, 24 F. (2d) 910,913 (C. C. A.
9th, 1928); Weygandt v. Bartle, 88 Ore. 310, 318, 171 Pac. 587, 590 (1918). See also 3 \VIs-
3toRE § 905; cases are collected ibid., n. 4 and in Note (1931) 74 A. L. R. 1042. For state
statutes see Ladd, supra note 1, at 88-91; Callahan and Ferguson, Evidence and the New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 2 (1937) 47 YaLE L. J. 194, 203; Schatz, Impcachment of
One's Own Witness: Present New York Law and Proposed Changes (1942) 27 CoRN. L. Q.
377, 381-9.
3. This is the orthodox view. Ellis v. United States, 138 F. (2d) 612, 616 (C. C. A.
8th, 1943); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bacalis, 94 F. (2d) 200, 202 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938).
See 3 WiV om §§ 1017-9. Cases collected id. at § 1018, n. 3 and Note (1941) 133 A. L. R.
1454, 1455-61. But see note 24 infra.
4. Schneider v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 454, 457 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932); State v.
D'Adame, 84 N. J. L. 386, 397, 86 At. 414, 418 (1913). The jury accordingly may make a
pro lanto determination of the testimony in chief which has been discredited. See Chicago,
St. P., Minn., and 0. Ry. v. Kulp, 102 F. (2d) 352, 358 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
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the judge 5 that the extra-judicial statement may be considered only for the
purpose of evaluating the witness' credibility by indicating his capability
of telling two different stories.6
In the recent case of United States v. Michener 7 the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit rejected a variation of the neutralization doctrine
which would have made the .determination of whether the testimony had
been neutralized a question for the court rather than for the jury. In a
prosecution under the false claims statute,' two witnesses for the govern-
ment gave testimony damaging to its own case.9 The government was then
permitted without objection to impeach by offering proof of inconsistent
statements the witnesses had made before trial. 10 In both instances, after
the prosecutor had introduced the impeaching testimony but before de-
fendant had been given opportunity to cross-examine, the trial judge on his
own motion withdrew the witnesses and told the jury their testimony had
been neutralized and was to be "for nothing held." 11 The circuit court, on
appeal, called this procedure reversible error, and held that the question of
neutralization was essentially one of credibility and must go to the jury."
The district court's conception of the neutralization doctrine had not
seemingly appeared in other reported cases aside from a lone dictum in
United States v. Young.'3 In that case the court said that, in instances of this
type, the "best practice" is to allow the impeaching party to remove his
5. Statev. D'Adame, 84 N.J. L. 386,397, 86 Ati. 414,418 (1913). Compare Young v.
United States, 97 F. (2d) 200, 207 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938) with State v. Kysilka, 85 N. J. L.
712, 714-5, 90 AtI. 309, 310-1 (1914) and State v. Jolly, 112 Mont. 352, 356,'116 P. (2d)
686, 688 (1941).
6. An early American statement of the doctrine was by Shaw, C. J. in Common-
wealth v. Starkweather, 10 Cush. 59, 60 (Mass. 1852). What is sought to be elicited, accord-
ing to Wigmore, is the "undefined capacity to err;" it is the "repugnancy of the two" state-
ments that is significant. 3 WIGMORE §§ 685-6. It would seem, however, that if the prior
statement is of such weight as to eradicate completely the testimony in chief, its effect has
gone beyond the demonstration of a mere "capacity to err." See Pulitzer v. Chapman,
337 Mo. 298, 319, 85 S. W. (2d) 400, 411 (1935); ef. Zimberg v. United States, 142 F. (2d)
132, 136 (C. C. A. 1st, 1944); Stewart v. Baltimore & 0. R. R., 137 F, (2d) 527, 529 (C. C. A.
2d, 1943).
7. 152 F. (2d) 880 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945).
8. 40 STAT. 1015 (1918), 18 U. S. C. § 80 (1940).
9. See Brief for the United States, p. 30, United States v. Michener, 152 F. (2d) 880
(C. C. A. 3d, 1945) (hereinafter cited as Brief for United States); Brief for Appellant, pp.
56-9, United States v. Michener, 152 F. (2d) 880 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945) (hereinafter cited as
Brief for Appellant).
10. One witness was impeached on the basis of a prior oral, and the other by use of a
prior written, statement. Id. at 58-9; Brief for United States, p. 30.
11. Brief for Appellant, pp. 57, 59.
12. United States v. Michener, 152 F. (2d) 880, 885 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945). "Pieces of
evidence do not, like the action of chemical elements, so 'neutralize' each other." Ibd.
Compare Schneider v. United States, 57 F. (2d) 454, 457 (C. C. A. 3d, 1932).
13. 97 F. (2d) 200 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938). This case was reversed and remanded for fail-




witness and to strike the testimony from the record.14 Kdmn v. United
States 15 was cited as authority for this dictum, but the Kuhn case involved a
different situation at the trial; there, the prosecutor, after having introduced
evidence to impeach his own witness, later moved to sustain defendant's
objection to the testimony. The court granted the motion, admonished the
jury not to consider the evidence, and withdrew the witness.', Accordingly,
in terms of controlling precedent, the circuit court in the instant case would
appear correct in rejecting the interpretation promulgated by the trial
court.
17
The procedure of the district court would similarly seem improper from
the viewpoint of expeditious trial practice. To keep from the jury the issue
of whether or not the impeaching evidence had in fact neutralized the testi-
mony in chief,' 8 to deny the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine,"
and to prevent the witness' explaining the inconsistency 0 deprives the trier
of fact of possibly relevant evidence. On the other hand, for the defendant
to recall the witness as his own and thus reopen the issues of the allegedly
neutralized testimony, entails needless duplication and abets further con-
fusion of the jury.
14. Id. at 205. This dictum was apparently accepted without qualification in Note
(1938) 117 A. L. R. 326, 329.
15. 24 F. (2d) 910 (C. C. A. 9th, 1928).
16. Id. at 913.
17. In Levine v. United States, 79 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935) the court expresEly
refused to decide the point, but upheld the withdrawal of a "neutralized" government
witness, on the ground that defendant had not properly asserted his right to cross-examine.
There may be tendency to confuse the procedure of the district court in the principal case
with the rule that where there is no evidence supporting a cause of action or a prosecution
other than extra-judicial statements, the trial court may dismiss the action or direct a ver-
dict for defendant. MacLachlan v. Perry, 68 F. (2d) 769, 772 (App. D. C. 1934); ef. Bern-
hardt v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. R., 132 Neb. 346, 352, 272 N. W. 209, 212 (1937), cerl. denied,
302 U. S. 685 (1937); Largin v. State, 37 Tex. Cr. App. 574, 575,40 S. NV. 280 (1897).
18. United States v. Michener, 152 F. (2d) 880, 884-5 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945). See notes 4
and 6 supra.
19. United States v. Michener, 152 F. (2d) 880, 884 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945). The fact that
a party may make a witness his own is no basis for denial of the right of cro-s-examination.
Resurrection Gold Mining Co. v. Fortune Gold Mining Co., 129 Fed. 668, 676 (C. C. A. 8th,
1904).
20. United States v. Michener, 152 F. (2d) 880, 884 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945). This is an
opportunity which a witness ordinarily will not be denied. Southern Transportation Co. v.
Ashford, 48 F. (2d) 191, 192 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); Meadors v. Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 622,
626, 136 S. W. (2d) 1066, 1068 (1940); Quartz v. Pittsburgh, 340 Pa. 277, 279, 16 A. (2d)
400, 401 (1940). See 3 WVmioRE § 737 n. 1. Yet it might well be asked whether the extent
to which such an opportunity will be granted should not be discretionary with the court.
At the trial in the principal case, after witness Miller had been confronted with a contra-
dictory written statement, he endeavored, according to appellant himself, "for pages, there-
after ... to explain that he had not fully understood the contents of the statement, that
it had been signed in a moment of great nervous tension, and that his present testimony was
correct." Brief for Appellant, p. 59. It would seem that the witness here had adequate
opportunity to explain, and that appellant could not be heard to complain. See Di Carlo v.
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It would appear therefore that reversal by the appellate court was justi-
fiable in order to rectify a procedure unfair to the defendant. Yet the deci-
sion on appeal is not without its unfortunate consequences: the litigants have
been subjected to a costly and time-consuming appeal; the jury will, on new
trial, be exposed to a mass of conflicting testimony, part of which they will be
instructed to consider only in the light of the credibility of the witness and
not as substantive evidence. It seems unlikely that such an instruction is
effectually heeded.2 1 Once the witness is on the stand it would seem prefer-
able to let extra-judicial statements come in for whatever they may be worth
so long as the declarant is present, and to rely on impeachment and cross-
examination to provide the jury with data to test the weight of the witness'
testimony.2 2 The net result of the principal case serves but to point tip the
difficulty of giving lip service to outmoded rules of evidence and at the same
time attempting to dispense substantial justice; neither trial nor appellate
court has successfully bridged the gap.
The original basis for the rule against impeaching one's own witness-
that a party "vouched" for all those who testified in his favor-is an an-
achronism today, 2 and the objection to giving substantive effect to a wit-
ness' extra-judicial statements on grounds of hearsay would seem to have
little validity when the declarant is on the stand and available for cross-
examination.24 The evils flowing from perpetuation of the rule, on the other
United States, 6 F. (2d) 364, 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), cert. denied, 268 U. S. 706 (1925) ("Tile
latitude to be allowed in the examination of a [recalcitrant] witness is wholly within the dis-
cretion of the trial judge."); Brusletten v. Relyea, 207 Minn. 375, 376-7, 291 N. W. 608,
609 (1940).
21. Medlin v. County Board of Education, 167 N. C. 239, 241, 83 S. E. 483,484 (1914).
But see Wright v. Beckett, 1 M. & Rob. 414,419, 174 Eng. Rep. 143, 144-5 (C. P. 1833).
22. See note 24 infra.
23. The basis for the rule goes back to the time when witnesses were compurgators or
"oath-helpers." See Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 220-4, 202 Pac. 1099, 1100-3 (1922);
3 WIG31ORE § 896; Ladd, supra note 1, at 69-76. The other rationalizations for tile rule--
that a party is bound by his witness' statements and that he guarantees his general credi-
bility-grew out of the ancient conception of "vouching" and appear equally without justifi-
cation today. 3 WIG31ORE §§ 897-8; Ladd, supra note 1, at 76-88. But see Hernandez v.
State, 22 So. (2d) 781, 783 (Fla. 1945) ("Mr. Farrior put him on and he vouches for him,")
The real reluctance of the courts to abandon the rule completely seems to stem from a vague
feeling that a party ought not to have the means at his disposal to coerce his witness, but
this has been described as "speculative," "of trifling practical weight," and protecting only
"the disreputable and shifty witness." 3 WIGItORE § 899; see Ladd, supra note 1, at 84-S.
See also the horrors paraded in Sturgis v. State, 2 Okla. Cr. 362, 391-2, 102 Pac. 57, 68-9
(1909).
24. To meet the qualifications of the hearsay rule, the statement must be made under
oath and subject to cross-examination. See 5 WiGMORE § 1362. For this reason a witness'
extra-judicial assertion is considered inadmissable as substantive evidence. Hernandez v.
State, 22 So. (2d) 781 (Fla. 1945). Yet since it may come in for purposes of impeachment,
it is questionable whether it should be classified as pure hearsay. See 3 WViGoRm § 1018;
State v. D'Adame, 84 N. J. 386, 396, 86 Atl. 414, 418 (1913). There would seem no valid
reason for refusing to give it substantive effect, since the witness whose prior contradiction is
being introduced is under oath and available for cross-examination by counsel, confronta-
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hand, would seem to vitiate completely any vestige of its utility: excluding
relevant evidence, 25 obscuring the merits, confounding the jury,o, unduly
curbing the discretion of the judge,- delaying the trial,3 and inordinately
tion by the party opponent, and scrutiny by the jury. See Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.
(2d) 364,368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), cert. denied, 268 U. S. 706 (1925); State v. Jolly, 112 Mont.
352, 355, 116 P. (2d) 686, 688 (1941); 3 WIGMORE § 1018; Ladd, supra note 1, at 86-3;
MoD. CODE OF Evm. (1942) Rule 106(1).
A few courts have allowed prior statements to be used as substantive evidence but the
implications of their decisions have unfortunately not been expanded. In the federal courts
the leading case is Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F. (2d) 364 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), cert. denied,
268 U. S. 706 (1925), wherein Judge Learned Hand said, at 368: "If, from all that the jury
see of a witness, they conclude that what he says now is not the truth, but what he said
before, they are nonetheless deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in
court." The federal courts in recent cases, however, have so limited the decision of the -
Di Carlo case, though not always without reluctance, as to leave little of its vitality: see
e.g., United States v. Block, 88 F. (2d) 613, 620 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), ceri. denied, 301 U. S.
690 (1937); United States v. Graham, 102 F. (2d) 436, 442 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), cert. denied,
307 U. S. 643 (1939); Ellis v. United States, 138 F. (2d) 612, 616-21 (C. C. A. 8th, 1943).
But see Chicago, St. P., Minn., & 0. Ry. v. Kulp, 102 F. (2d) 352, 358 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939);
United States v. Biener, 52 F. Supp. 54, 56 (E. D. Pa. 1943).
Nor have efforts by state courts to depart from the doctrine been eminently succec-ful.
The Supreme Court of Missouri in Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337 Mo. 298, 320, 85 S. W. (2d)
400, 411 (1935) allowed the introduction of a prior inconsistent sworn deposition as sub-
stantive evidence, and this was extended in O'Malley v. City of St. Louis, 343 Mo. 14, 21,
119 S. W. (2d) 785, 787 (1938) to a previous written contradictory statement by party
plaintiff on the precedent of the Pulitzer case. In subsequent decisions, however, inferior
Missouri courts have refused to broaden the PuliLer and O'Malley decisions. See WVoefle v.
Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co., 112 S. W. (2d) 863, 874 (Mo. App. 1933); Short v. White,
133 S. IV. (2d) 1039, 1042 (Mo. App. 1939); Kennard v. McCrory, 136 S. NV. (2d) 710, 715
(Mo. App. 1940); Zamora v. Wkroodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc., 157 S. WN. (2d) 601, 606
(Mo. App. 1942). And see Hertzman, Prior Inconsistent Statements As Substant ir Evidence
(1941) 12 Mo. BAR J. 83.
25. "There is no mythical necessity that the case must be decided only in accordance
with the truth of words uttered under oath in court" Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F. (2d)
364, 368 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925), cert. denied, 268 U. S. 706 (1925). Where a party is apprised
that a witness may change his story, he may hesitate to call the witness at all, lest the court
find no bona fide "surprise" and deny admission to the prior statement in toto. See, e.g.,
Chalmette Petroleum Corp. v. Chalmette Oil Distributing Co., 143 F. (2d) 826 (C. C. A.
5th, 1944), where neither party would risk calling the witness; the court suggested that, in
such a case, the judge should call him and allow both parties to cross.e.xmmine and impeach.
See also Ladd, supra note 1, at 86; Fuller, Impeachment of Own Witness [19451 Wis. L. Rxv.
434, 438.
26. It is doubtful whether the jury can be expected to comprehend the legalistic dis-
tinction between impeaching testimony and substantive evidence. Medlin v. County Board
of Education, 167 N. C. 239, 241, 83 S. E. 483, 484 (1914). See Pulitzer v. Chapman, 337
Mo. 298,319, 85 S. IV. (2d) 400,411 (1935). The distinction is in substance no different from
that in which a witness contradicts his direct testimony on cross-examination. The situa-
tion becomes more confused when the witness admits part of the prior statement and denies
the rest. See Perry v.- F. Byrd, 280 Mich. 580, 582, 274 N. IV. 335, 336 (1937) and cazes
cited note 6 supra.
27. The trial court subjects itself to reversal when it determines what constitutes "sur-
prise," "hostility, .... lapse of memory," "prejudice," etc. preliminary to an attempt by the
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emphasizing the importance of courtroom tactics and strategems of clever
counsel.29 To promote a just and expeditious disposition of a case on the
merits is the raison d'etre for a rule of evidence; when it ceases to serve that
function, it should be abolished.3
party to impeach his witness (see cases cited note 2 supra) or undertakes to instruct the
jury as to the limited effect of impeaching testimony (see note 5 supra). The better view
makes such determinations entirely discretionary with the judge. London Guarantee &
Accident Co. v. Woelfle, 83 F. (2d) 325, 334 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936). Compare the early opinlon
of Lord Abbott quoted in Clarke v. Saffrey, Ry. & Mood. 127, 171 Eng. Rep. R. 966, 967
(1824). Abolishing all vestiges of the rule, on the other hand, would not expose the trial
court to such needless reversals. See MOD. CODE OF EVID. (1942) Rules 106, 303.
28. It would seem desirable to eliminate the time-consuming practices concomitant
with preservation of the rule: argument by counsel whether the party was "surprised" or
"entrapped," whether the testimony was "damaging," whether the witness was "hostile,"
and whether a proper foundation for impeachment had been laid.
29. Much would seem to depend on the ingenuity of counsel in making a sufficient show-
ing of surprise or entrapment. See note 2 supra. And see State v. Baltimore & 0. R. Co.,
117 Md. 280, 284, 83 At. 166, 167 (1912); see also the foreword by Morgan, MOD. CODE OF
EvlD. (1942) 10-1.
30. Opinion is virtually unanimous among commentators advocating complete aban-
donment of the rule. See 3 WIGMORE §§ 905, 1018; BENTHAM, A TREATISE ON JUDICIAL
EViDENcE (1825) 103-4; Callahan and Ferguson, supra note 2, at 201-4; Ladd, supra note 1,
at 94-6; MOD. CODE OF Evm. (1942) Rule 106 (1); Moidel, Impeaching One's own Witness
(1940) 24 J. AMi. Jun. Soc. 85, 87; MORGAN and others, THE LAW OV EVIDENCE (1927) xvi
n. 1; Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence (1937) 4 U. or Cm. L. REV.
247, 257; Schatz, Impeachment of One's Own Witness: Present New York Law and Proposed
Changes (1942) 27 CORN. L. Q. 389-94.
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